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* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 




KRAUSE, Circuit Judge. 
 Kendell Alexander, a former federal inmate who worked in his prison’s UNICOR 
facility,1 brought a Fifth Amendment claim under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents 
of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), against his manager, Robert Ortiz, 
for allegedly denying him pay increases, overtime opportunities, and promotions on 
account of race.  The District Court granted Ortiz’s motion to dismiss.  For the following 
reasons, we will affirm.2 
A. Discussion3 
The Supreme Court has “clearly communicate[d] that expanding Bivens beyond 
those contexts [it has] already recognized . . . is disfavored.”  Bistrian v. Levi, 912 F.3d 
79, 95 (3d Cir. 2018).  Thus, before allowing a damages remedy for a federal officer’s 
constitutional violations, a court must first compare the claim to those previously 
recognized under Bivens and ask whether the claim either “arises in a new context or 
involves a new category of defendants.”  Hernandez v. Mesa, 140 S. Ct. 735, 743 (2020) 
 
1 UNICOR is a wholly owned corporation of the federal government that seeks to 
“provide employment for the greatest number of those inmates in [federal] . . . 
correctional institutions . . . as is reasonably possible.”  18 U.S.C. § 4122(b)(1).   
 
2 The Court appointed Christian J. Pistilli, Esq. and Noam Kutler, Esq. to represent 
Alexander on appeal.  They have ably discharged that responsibility, for which the Court 
is grateful. 
 
3 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and we have 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  On appeal, Alexander has not contested the District 
Court’s dismissal of his First Amendment retaliation claim against Ortiz, so we deem that 
claim abandoned and will not discuss it here.  See Free Speech Coal., Inc. v. Att’y Gen., 




(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  If it does, the next question is whether 
there are “any special factors [that] counse[l] hesitation” in extending Bivens.  Id. 
(alterations in original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  If the court 
answers both questions in the affirmative, it may not expand Bivens to cover the claim.   
Alexander argues (1) his claim arises in an existing context and against a category 
of defendants the Supreme Court already recognized in Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 
(1979); and (2) even if the context is considered new, no special factors weigh against 
creating a Bivens remedy.  We reject both contentions.   
1. New Context  
Alexander challenges the District Court’s determination that his racial 
discrimination claim against his UNICOR supervisor arises in a context different from 
Davis, which involved a gender discrimination claim against a congressman.  See 442 
U.S. at 230–31.  We think the District Court correctly reasoned that “Davis, while 
addressing a Fifth Amendment discrimination claim, concerns a congressional” rather 
than “prison employment context.”  JA 25.    
 The Supreme Court’s conception of “new context” is “broad,” Hernandez, 140 S. 
Ct. at 743, and includes such considerations as whether a different type of officer is sued 
or the officer is subject to different “statutory or other legal mandate[s],” Ziglar v. 
Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1860 (2017).  A UNICOR manager and a congressman are 
officers from different branches of the federal government, and as the District Court 
recognized, a UNICOR workplace and a congressional office are “vastly different,” 




 Because “[n]one of the [Supreme Court’s] prior Bivens cases addressed federal 
prisoners in the prison employment context,” JA 25, the District Court correctly 
determined that Alexander’s claim arises in a new context.   
2. Special Factors Counseling Hesitation  
Alexander also urges that the District Court erroneously denied him a Bivens 
remedy out of concern for the separation of powers.  We see no flaw in the District 
Court’s special-factors analysis.   
The District Court began with the premises that “separation-of-powers principles 
are or should be central to the analysis” and that, when considering “whether the 
Judiciary is well suited, absent congressional action or instruction, to consider and weigh 
the costs and benefits of allowing a damages action to proceed,” any “hesitat[ion] before 
answering that question in the affirmative” indicates Congress, not the court, should 
decide whether to create a damages remedy.  JA 32–33 (quoting Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. at 
1857–58).   
 With this “particularly weighty” concern for not intruding on the other branches in 
mind, Bistrian, 912 F.3d at 90, the District Court observed that “the prison workplace is 
an area that is heavily regulated by the legislative and executive branches.”  JA 34.  
Indeed, Congress envisioned that UNICOR would be managed within the executive 
branch by a board appointed by the President, see 18 U.S.C. § 4121, and did not suggest 
any role for the federal courts.  And especially telling is that Congress knew how to 
create a remedy for injuries suffered in UNICOR workplaces but chose to do so within 




pointed out, in 18 U.S.C. § 4126(c)(4), “Congress specifically created a mechanism 
[through UNICOR and the Federal Bureau of Prisons] by which prisoners could be 
compensated for workplace injuries and illnesses, but did not extend that remedy to other 
forms of workplace discrimination or constitutional violations.”  JA 33–34; see also 28 
C.F.R. pt. 301.  We agree this remedial scheme for physical injuries is a strong signal that 
Congress did not intend to create a judicially enforceable remedy for constitutional 
violations and that any decision to do so must be left to Congress.   
 In sum, the District Court’s conclusion that “the prison workplace context is a 
special factor precluding extending the Bivens remedy,” JA 32, is correct.  
B. Conclusion 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s order dismissing 
Alexander’s complaint.   
